Another insightful commentary from Cedars Hill Group, CHG Issue #222, The Great Battle of Our Time, explores geopolitical conflict and its impact on global markets

Cedars Hill Group — April 13, 2026 — War is unpredictable. Whenever a politician chooses to engage in a war, they take a great risk because the nature of politics is to make promises and deliver on them and war increases the chance of political fai... 

---

​CHG Issue #222: The great battle of our time

a new global balance of power is being forged in the waters of Hormuz

Cedars Hill Group — April 13, 2026 — War is unpredictable. Whenever a politician chooses to engage in a war, they take a great risk because the nature of politics is to make promises and deliver on them and war increases the chance of political failure. Therefore, the natural question to start with regarding the Iran War is why Trump chose to attack Iran? Trump’s own National Security Strategy, published late last year, stated the US would focus on the Western Hemisphere, and now, only a few months later we are engaged in another war in the Middle East. Trump likes to be unpredictable, but the NSS document was core to his reelection campaign. Therefore, we must look closely at the circumstances around Iran and US imperatives to understand why we acted in Iran and how events may unfold.

In 2021 Iran began enriching uranium and currently has a stockpile of approximately 440kg of 60% enriched uranium. That is near weapons grade uranium which is only several weeks away from becoming weapons grade uranium. Given Iran’s known capabilities they could have produced or have already produced 9-10 nuclear weapons. This represented a major escalation from JCPOA compliance and triggered the initial strikes on Fordow and Isfahan where Iran likely stored its stockpile. Those strikes likely entombed Iran’s stockpile, if intelligence was correct, but failed to decisively eliminate the risk of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Why is the Iranian nuclear program such a big deal? According to Alexander Campbell, “It is an existential threat to the entire architecture underneath globalism.” Ok, well we know that Trump is not a globalist so why does the US care?

After WWII, the US emerged as the dominant global power, rebuilt its allies and enemies in Europe and Japan and then squared off against Communist USSR during the Cold War. After the breakup of the USSR, the US became the undisputed global power with the only other nuclear powers being Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction governed peaceful relations between the nuclear powers leaving non-nuclear powers in need of security assurances. Countries not aligned with Western globalism like Russia and China began supporting the development of nuclear programs in other non-aligned countries such as North Korea and Iran to shift the balance of power. North Korea became a nuclear power in 2006, and post-revolution Iran revived the Western-backed civilian nuclear program under the authority of the Supreme Leader with the goal of achieving highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

Under the Western globalist system, the tradeoff was straightforward: the US would police the oceans keeping trading routes open and there would be no need for more nukes or fighting. Treaties like the NPT were enacted and an unprecedented period of economic prosperity was ushered in by globalization. All the while Russia worked to undermine the Europeans with energy exports while China worked to undermine the US with cheap manufacturing exports which also served to hollow out America’s manufacturing base. Russian and Chinese tactics were designed to degrade and undermine the very heart and soul of Western globalism.

After decades of spilling American blood on distant shores in what ended up being endless, ideological wars and emptying its treasury, the US began to grow tired of this arrangement and Trump campaigned on it, winning a second term as President. Not only was the US growing tired of endless, ideological wars but it was starting to see Russia and China’s strategy paying off. Ray Dalio says that we are in a new World War as evidenced by the growing number of conflicts around the world: Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Gaza-Lebanon, Yemen-Saudi Arabia-Sudan-UAE, US-Israel-GCC-Iran. Trump has repeatedly pressed US allies, especially the Europeans, to increase defense spending and start taking responsibility for their interests abroad. The US cannot carry the weight of policing global trade routes and managing regional balances of power alone. Dalio has also argued that the US losing the battle for the Strait of Hormuz could lead to a flight from US assets and an eventual end to the US hegemony.

This is the reason why the US cannot allow Iran to become a nuclear power. It would further undermine the already overextended US-maintained global balance of power. Realistically, it may not result in immediate decline, but it would greatly undermine US power and further strengthen our adversaries at the same time that our old alliance structures are failing. George Friedman has declared that NATO is at risk and may be failing, and while the US is putting pressure on NATO it cannot allow that alliance to fail and for Iran to become a nuclear power at the same time. The US needs it’s allies more than ever but not the post-Cold War alliance structures like NATO.

Trump has chosen to preempt the decline of US dominance by focusing on the Western hemisphere, but has he made a mistake in Iran? Has he revealed a US vulnerability like Russia did in Ukraine? Critics of the war point out this is a war of choice which is true but also reduces the risk of the decline that Dalio has warned about. The US is overextended but not yet at a critical point; committing ground troops will further overextend us and increase the odds of the fall of the US hegemony. What Dalio’s pattern matching misses is that the US is not as economically dependent on the Strait as Great Britain was on Suez and the fight is not only about access to that strategic chokepoint.

The reopening of the Strait is both a ceasefire condition and Iran’s primary bargaining chip. Will control of the Strait be taken away from Iran and which countries are willing to the spend blood and money to do it? France has shown its hand by aligning with Russia, China, and the IRGC to oppose a UN Security council vote allowing defensive force to unblock the Strait. The US position has been that the countries that need it the most should be the ones bear the cost of taking control from Iran. The US is less interested in controlling the Strait but also can’t allow Iran to control it and have a nuclear program. A weakened US can no longer provide economic and security guarantees for Europe, but the Europeans are reluctant to take on the responsibility and Iran sees this as an opening.

The splits in the post-Cold War power alliances have been laid bare for the world to see. It is not just Trump’s obnoxiousness; it is also the European reluctance to stop being free loaders. But Iran is deeply divided as well. The IRGC is strongly opposed to negotiations with the West and continues to cling to power which presents a significant threat to any other elements within Iran to exercise control and comply with any ceasefire or peace agreement. The IRGC cares only about regime survival and may have been wounded enough to be threatened but not enough to be defeated, which could be one of the worst possible outcomes because it would necessitate their complete defeat which can only be achieved with ground troops or an internal uprising.

The US can cede control of the Strait if Iran gives up their nukes, but this arrangement would depend heavily on internal compliance and with the IRGC still exercising power it makes it very difficult to trust any such agreement. The IRGC stance prior to this weekend’s talks made achieving anything highly unlikely and Trump has now responded by imposing a blockade on Iran. This is the natural escalation against the weakened IRGC who can only respond with asymmetric tactics such as swarm attacks, harassment, drone strikes, and mines. The US has overwhelming conventional superiority and has already degraded Iran’s navy (~150 ships sunk) and many shore-based assets. Military analysts have historically estimated that the Strait could be reopened but it could take months depending on Iran’s tactics and capacity for interdiction. The US strategy now becomes one of containment and isolation to essentially “starve-out” the weakened IRGC and that extends the timeline of this conflict considerably.

The blockade is also a move against the allies who have been cutting side-deals with Iran and it puts China in a very difficult position. China consumes 80-90% of Iran’s oil and only has reserves to last it 90-120 days, which is likely why China has been keen to keep the Trump-Xi summit on the calendar. The US strategy seeks to unite its allies against the IRGC and bring about a swift end to the war.

The IRGC has limited conventional options and therefore seeks to prolong the conflict and turn US voters and allies against it. However, the blockade signals a willingness to go the long haul and escalate the conflict to global isolation which neutralizes the IRGC strategy of enforcing an ideological tollway on the Strait. The US strategy is constrained by the actions of its allies, the mid-terms, the financial markets, and the economy which is increasingly likely to experience a recession (Trump gets his rate cuts!). The IRGC strategy is constrained by its ability to survive, but they have far more to lose and a cornered adversary is the most dangerous kind. Both the US and Iran are vying for the rest of the world to tip the scales in their favor.

“The board is set; the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time”
- Gandalf

Source: https://cedarshillgroup.substack.com/p/chg-issue-222-the-great-battle-of